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U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING & TERRORIST FINANCING

New York Law School's April 2014 symposium entitled "Combating Threats to
the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task Force" was the first
law school symposium to address the impact of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) on the legal profession.' For this reason, I was pleased to have been invited
to participate and contribute this article discussing the efforts by the U.S. legal
profession to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the FATE. Part II explains that
money laundering and terrorist financing are federal crimes to which U.S. lawyers
are subject. Part III addresses the U.S. legal profession's efforts to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing by educating U.S. lawyers on how to avoid
unwitting involvement. This section describes the educational efforts to date,
explains why additional efforts are warranted, and offers suggestions for further steps
that might be undertaken. The article concludes by noting that, while progress has
been made, there is still work to be done to educate U.S. lawyers about how to avoid
unwitting involvement in money laundering and terrorist financing schemes.
I.

FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE BACKGROUND

Established in 1989, the FATF is an intergovernmental organization whose
objectives include "combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related
threats to the integrity of the international financial system. ' 2 Although the FATE is
comprised of only thirty-four members and two regional associations, it has a number
of affiliates that collectively generate a worldwide impact.3 The United States is a
founding member of the FATF and considers the FATF to be a critical part of U.S.
efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.4
1.

New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial
System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter New York Law School FATF
Symposium], availableat http://www.nylslawreview.com/fatf/.

2.

Who WeAre, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/whoweare/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015). When the FATF was established in 1989, its focus was on money laundering. See id.
After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) expanded its mission to
include combating terrorist financing. See History of the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

3.

Members and Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). In addition to the thirty-six members, the FATF has
eight "Associate Members," including the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG); the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF); the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on
the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measure and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL);
the Eurasian Group (EAG); the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
(ESAAMLG); the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD);
the Inter- Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA); and the
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). Id. There are also a
number of entities that are FATF Observers, such as The World Bank, the African Development Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, and the European Central Bank (ECB). Id.

4.

See, e.g., Michael Rosen, Policy Advisor, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks at New York Law School Law
Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task
Force Symposium (Apr. 25, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 4F8TpKweET8
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One of the primary means by which the FATF seeks to accomplish these goals is
by having its members agree to implement the FATF Recommendations.5 For many
years, these Recommendations were known as the 40+9 Recommendations, 6 but
they were reformulated in February 2012 and are now known as either the FATF
Forty Recommendations or the FATF Recommendations ("Recommendations"). 7

(explaining the importance of the FATF to the United States); Press Release, United Nations Office on
Drugs & Crime (Oct. 25, 2011) (estimating that criminals may have laundered US$1.6 trillion in 2009),
available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ress/releases/2011/October/unodc-estimates-that-criminalsmay-have-laundered-usdollar-1.6 -trillion-in-2009.html. The founding members of the FATF were the
countries that comprised the G7 Summit in 1989: Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, along with the president of the European Commission. See History of the
FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015); About the G8, U.S DEP'T STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ecosum/2012g8/about/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2015) ("During the 1970s, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Japan, and Italy formed the Group of Six (G6) as an informal grouping of advanced industrialized economies
that would meet annually to discuss matters of political and economic significance. Canada was added in
1976 to form the Group of 7 (G7).").
5.

See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

6.

See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.
ftatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF/20Standards /20 -%2040 /20Recommendations%/20rc.pdf;
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (Oct. 2001),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%/20Standards /20-%20
IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20N%20rc.pdf. The original Forty Recommendations
date from 1990 andwere amended in 1996. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS
2 (Oct. 2003), availableat http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%/20Standards%/20
-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf. In 2001, soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
FATF added eight Special Recommendations to address terrorist financing. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING 88 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF/2Standards /2-O/20IX%/20Special %20
Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf. In 2003, the FATF amended the Forty Recommendations
by, inter alia, adding the provisions to address gatekeepers other than financial institutions. In 2004,
the FATF adopted a ninth Special Recommendation. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE FATF
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 RECOMMENDATIONS], availableat http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Pdfs/FATF-Recommendations.pdf. Collectively
these Recommendations were known as the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd,
The GatekeeperInitiative and the Risk-BasedApproach to Client Due Diligence: The Imperativefor Voluntary
Good Practices Guidancefor U.S. Lawyers, J. PROF. LAW., 2010, at 88 [hereinafter Shepherd RBA]
(referring to the 40+9 Recommendations).

7.

2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6. The 2012 revisions consolidated, reorganized, and renumbered
the existing Recommendations, which had been amended over a series of years. See id. at 4-5. As the
introduction explains:
The revisions address new and emerging threats, clarify and strengthen many of the
existing obligations, while maintaining the necessary stability and rigour in the
Recommendations. The FATF Standards have also been revised to strengthen the
requirements for higher risk situations, and to allow countries to take a more focused
approach in areas where high risks remain or implementation could be enhanced.
Id. at 8.
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Although the Recommendations do not have the force of law,8 FATF members
have agreed that the failure to implement them is grounds for expulsion from the
organization. 9 Despite the soft-law nature of the Recommendations, they are
extremely influential because it is unlikely that countries such as the United States
would want to be excluded from the FATF, which is a powerful tool in the fight
against money laundering and terrorist financing.
FATF members evaluate their compliance with the Recommendations through a
mutual evaluation process." The United States has undergone three Mutual
Evaluations, the most recent in June 2006,12 and is scheduled to undergo the on-site
visit for its Fourth Mutual Evaluation in early 2016, with the FATF Plenary
Discussion tentatively scheduled for October 2016." In 2013, FATF members agreed
that during the fourth round of mutual evaluations, efforts would be made to measure
not just technical compliance with the Recommendations, but also the "effectiveness"
4
of a country's measures.
8.

See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the FinancialAction Task Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance,J.
PROF. LAW., 2010, at 6-7.

9.

See

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,

FATF

MEMBERSHIP POLICY

(Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://www.

anti-moneylaundering.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid
FBDFFOAE969F. Step 2(c) states:

02AAE1OF-F553-433A-8242-

The overall mutual evaluation needs to be regarded as satisfactory, and in particular the
level of compliance for the Recommendations dealing with the money laundering and
terrorist financing offences (R.1 & SR.II), freezing and confiscation (R.3 & SR.III),
customer due diligence (R.5), record-keeping (R.10), suspicious transaction reporting
(R.13 & SR.IV), financial sector supervision (R.23), and international co-operation
(R.35, R.36, R.40, SR.I & SR.V) need to be acceptable.
Id.
10.

See Rosen, supra note 4.

11.

Mutual Evaluations, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015) ("The FATF conducts peer reviews of each member on an ongoing basis to
assess levels of implementation of the FATF Recommendations, providing an in-depth description and
analysis of each country's system for preventing criminal abuse of the financial system.").

12.

See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(June 23, 2006)

[hereinafter U.S. THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/mer/MER /20US%/20full.pdf.
13.

See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, GLOBAL ASSESSMENTS CALENDAR (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/f atf/documents/assessments/Global-Assessment-Calendar.pdf (listing the
schedule for assessments under the 2013 methodology in Annex 1). This date already has been changed
once and is subject to further change.

14.

Proceduresforthe FATFFourthRound ofAML/CFTMutual Evaluations, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/documents/4th-round-procedures.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2015) ("The scope of the evaluations will involve two inter-related components for technical compliance
and effectiveness. The technical compliance component will assess whether the necessary laws, regulations
or other required measures are in force and effect, and whether the supporting anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) institutional framework is in place. The effectiveness component
will assess whether the AML/CFT systems are working, and the extent to which the country is achieving
the defined set of outcomes."); see also CENTER ON LAW & GLOBALIZATION, GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE OF
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The FATF's efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing go
beyond the Recommendations and the mutual evaluation process. The FATF also
issues a number of advisory papers and other documents. For example, the FATF
has published a number of different reports to help various kinds of entities use a
risk-based approach (RBA) to assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist
financing. 6 A risk-based assessment stands in contrast to a rigid rules-based "checkoff-the-box" approach; 7 the rationale is that everyone benefits if a potential
"gatekeeper" concentrates its resources on those clients and customers that pose the
greatest risk. 8 One of the most important documents from the legal profession's

DIRTY MONEY: ASSESSING ASSESSMENTS OF REGIMES TO CONTROL MONEY-LAUNDERING AND COMBAT
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report-

Global%20Surveillance%20ofo20Dirtyo20Money%201.30.2014.pdf
and offering recommendations).

(discussing assessment methods

15.

See generally Documents, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents.
jsp?lang en (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (containing dropdown menus that allow one to select from many
different types of documents). The document categories include Guidance, Meeting, News, Other,
Public Consultation, Recommendations, Report, Risk Based Approach, Speech, and Statistics. See id.

16.

See, e.g., Risk Based Approach, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/
riskbasedapproach/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (listing reports for the Banking Sector, Prepaid Cards,
Mobile Payments and Internet-Based Payment Services, the Life Insurance Sector, Money Services
Businesses, Legal Professionals, Casinos, Real Estate Agents, Accountants, Trust and Company Service
Providers (TCSPs), Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones, and Combating Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing-High Level Principles and Procedures). The FATF's first risk-based guidance was
produced for financial institutions. See Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardiansat the Gate: The Gatekeeper
Initiative andthe Risk-BasedApproachforTransactionalLawyers,43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. LJ. 607, 626
& nn.108-10 (2009) [hereinafter Shepherd, Guardians]; Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 91; FIN.
ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

(June 2007),

available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%/20Level %2Principles /20
and%20Procedures.pdf (containing information directed towards financial institutions).
1 7.

Under a "check-off-the -box" approach, those responding may view this as a required ministerial task that
must be completed without thoughtfully becoming engaged with the underlying issues. See Shepard,
Guardians,supra note 16, at 625 & n.106 ("The theoretical and practical underpinning of the risk-based
approach is to ensure that limited resources to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are
employed and allocated in the most efficient manner possible so that the greatest risks receive the highest
attention. In this fashion, the risk-based approach differs fundamentally from a rules-based approach.
Under a rules-based approach, a lawyer is required to comply with particular laws, rules, or regulations
irrespective of the underlying quantum or degree of risk."). Some commentators outside of the United
States refer to this concept as "tick-off-the-box" rather than "check-off-the-box."

18.

See generally FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing-HighLevel Principles and Procedures, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
documents/riskbasedapproach/fatfguidanceontherisk-basedapproachtocombatingmoneylaunderingand
terroristfinancing-highlevelprinciplesandprocedures.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). The term
"gatekeepers" has been used to refer to the category of entities that were added to the FATF
Recommendations in 2003. At that time, the Recommendations were expanded beyond financial
institutions to include others that might serve as "access points" for money launderers or terrorist
financing. As explained infra note 29 and accompanying text, the Recommendations refer to the covered
entities as "designated non-financial businesses and professions" (DNFBPs), but they are colloquially
known as "gatekeepers."
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perspective is the 2008 FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals ("FATF
20
RBA"),' 9 which sets forth a risk-based approach for the legal profession.
The FATF RBA is "high level guidance intended to provide a broad framework
for implementing a risk-based approach for the legal profession. ' 21 It applies to lawyers
who are engaged in one of five specified activities: "[1] buying and selling of real
estate; [2] managing of client money, securities or other assets; [3] management of
bank, savings or securities accounts; [4] organisation of contributions for the creation,
operation or management of companies; and [5] creation, operation or management of
22
legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.
The FATF RBA has been the subject of controversy. For example, as Duncan
Osborne's symposium article and remarks reveal, 23 the FATF has been criticized for
the process used to develop the FATF RBA, including its unwillingness to engage
24
meaningfully with private sector representatives.
A second controversy concerned whether the FATF would produce a separate
RBA for the legal profession. Given the legal profession's important role with respect
to the administration of justice, the rule of law, traditional concepts of attorneyclient confidentiality, and the independence of the legal profession from governments,
the legal profession thought it was important to have a risk-based report that
addressed its situation rather than including it with casinos, precious metal dealers,
and others. 2 The FATF initially was reluctant to prepare separate reports, although

19.

See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, RBA GUIDANCE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Oct. 23, 2008) [hereinafter

FATF RBA], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%/20Legal /20
professions.pdf.
20.

See Risk BasedApproach, supra note 16; Terry, supra note 8, at 15-16 ("[I]n addition to the document for
the legal profession, the FATF has produced guides on using a risk-based approach for the financial
sector, real estate agents, accountants, dealers in precious metals and stones, casinos, services businesses,
and the life insurance sector."); Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 92 ("Guidance for each of the other
[designated sectors] was published separately in 2008."); Dialogue with the Private Sector, FIN. ACTION
TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/private-sectormarch-2014.html (Mar. 26, 2014) ("The FATF organised a meeting of the Private Sector Consultative
Forum to discuss implementation of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/
CFT) measures set out in the FATF Recommendations, seek input and feedback into ongoing FATF
work, and hear about issues of concern or interest to the private sector."). The legal profession was the
last of the DNFBPs for which a risk-based approach (RBA) report was produced. See id. Following the
legal profession RBA, the FATF produced risk-based reports for sectors that were not DNFBPs. See
Risk BasedApproach, supra note 16.

21.

See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 93.

22.

2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 19-20 (Recommendation 22(d)). As Kevin Shepherd
observes, no further definitions are provided. See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 93.

23.

See, e.g., Duncan Osborne, The FinancialAction Task Force and the Legal Profession, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 421 (2014-2015); Shepherd, Guardians,supra note 16, at 626-47.

24.

See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 23, at 428, 431.

25.

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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it ultimately agreed to issue separate documents for each sector. 26 The FATF RBA
27
was the resulting document for the legal profession.
The third controversy concerned how the FATF RBA would address suspicious
transaction reporting (STR), which currently is found in Recommendation 23.2 To
understand this issue, some background is necessary. Recommendation 22 applies to
"designated non-financial businesses and professions" (DNFBPs), which is a FATF
term of art that includes casinos, real estate agents, precious metal dealers, trust and
company service providers, and "lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals
and accountants. ' 2 9 Recommendation 22 states that when these DNFBPs engage in
certain specified activities,3° they must comply with customer due diligence and recordkeeping requirements set out in other Recommendations. 3' Recommendation 23
supplements Recommendation 22 and sets forth STR requirements for the previously
defined DNFBPs; it states that DNFBPs, which include lawyers, "should be required
to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a
financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d) of
''
Recommendation 22. 32
As one might imagine, legal profession representatives from around the world
have objected to the implementation of this provision because it ignores principles of
client confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, and raises concerns related to the
administration of justice and rule of law. 33 As a result of vigorous objections by legal
26.

See Shepherd, Guardians,supra note 16, at 629.

27.

See id. at 629-30, 635-36.

28.

Compare FIN.

ACTION TASK FORCE, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS

6 (Recommendation 16) (June 20,

2003) [hereinafter 40+9 RECOMMENDATIONS], availableat http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
recommendations/pdfs/FATFo20Recommendationso202003.pdf, with 2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 6, at 20-21 (Recommendation 23). Because the FATF RBA was issued in 2008, before the 2012
Recommendations were adopted, it refers to the older numbers. For internal consistency purposes, this
article uses the current Recommendation numbers even though the FATF RBA uses the older numbers.
29.

2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 20 (Recommendation 22 (d)). Similar to lawyers, the other
DNFBPs identified in Recommendation 22 are only subject to the Recommendations when engaged in
specified activities, which differ, however, for different DNFBPs. Id. at 19-20. In the 40+9 version of the
Recommendations, what is currently Recommendation 22 was Recommendation 12. Compare 40+9
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 28, at 5 (Recommendation 12), with 2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, Supra
note 6, at 19-20 (Recommendation 22).

30.

See 2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 19-20 (identifying the five specified activities).

31.

Recommendation 22(d) states that Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17 apply to lawyers who are
engaged in the specified activities. See2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 19-20 (Recommendation
22).

32.

Id. at 20 (Recommendation 23(a)).

33.

See, e.g., Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 87 ("The [suspicious transaction reporting (STR)] requirement
and the [no-tipping-off (NTO)] rule have been a controversial aspect of the application of the Forty
Recommendations to the legal profession."); Ronald J. MacDonald, Money Laundering RegulationWhat Can Be Learnedfrom the Canadian Experience, J. PROF. LAW., 2010, at 144 n.2 (2010) (citing
Canadian litigation and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) Money Laundering
Committee web page and its contents).
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profession and government representatives, the Recommendations include an
Interpretative Note to Recommendation 23, which states that lawyers and other legal
professionals "are not required to report suspicious transactions if the relevant
information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional
'34
secrecy or legal professional privilege.
Controversy over the STR Recommendation surrounded the development of the
FATF RBA, as well as the Recommendations. The legal profession's representatives
argued that lawyers had different attributes than the other types of DNFBPs, such
as casinos or real estate dealers, and that lawyers should not be subject to either the
STR or the "no-tipping-off" rules .3 Although the FATF initially seemed reluctant
34. 2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 83. Because of the importance of this Interpretative Note, it
is reprinted below, despite its length:
INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 23
(DNFBPS - OTHER MEASURES)
1. Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as
independent legal professionals, are not required to report suspicious transactions if
the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to
professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.
2. It is for each country to determine the matters that would fall under legal
professional privilege or professional secrecy. This would normally cover information
lawyers, notaries or other independent legal professionals receive from or obtain
through one of their clients: (a) in the course of ascertaining the legal position of
their client, or (b) in performing their task of defending or representing that client
in, or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration or mediation proceedings.
3. Countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and
accountants to send their STR to their appropriate self-regulatory organisations,
provided that there are appropriate forms of cooperation between these organisations
and the FIU.
4. Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants
acting as independent legal professionals seek to dissuade a client from engaging in
illegal activity, this does not amount to tipping-off.
Id.

The 2012 Recommendations include the following explanation regarding the significance of Interpretive
Notes:
The FATF Standards comprise the Recommendations themselves and their Interpretive
Notes, together with the applicable definitions in the Glossary. The measures set out in
the FATF Standards should be implemented by all members of the FATF and the
FSRBs, and their implementation is assessed rigorously through Mutual Evaluation
processes, and through the assessment processes of the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank - on the basis of the FATF's common assessment methodology.
Some Interpretive Notes and definitions in the glossary include examples which
illustrate how the requirements could be applied. These examples are not mandatory
elements of the FATF Standards, and are included forguidance only. The examples are
not intended to be comprehensive, and although they are considered to be helpful
indicators, they may not be relevant in all circumstances.
Id. at 8.
35.

See Shepherd, Guardians,supra note 16, at 617-18. The "no-tipping-off" rule prohibits a lawyer from
advising a client that the lawyer has submitted a suspicious transaction report regarding that client. See
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to discuss these issues, 3 6 it ultimately agreed to omit these requirements from the
FATF RBA for lawyers. 37 It is worth noting that the FATF expected each country to
develop its own approach to elaborate upon the high-level guidance provided in the
FATF RBA.38
As a final background point, it is important to note that with respect to the legal
profession, the FATF's Third Mutual Evaluation of the United States rated it
"noncompliant" or "partially compliant" on several points.39 These noncompliant
ratings involved, inter alia, the United States' failure to have its lawyers subject to

generally 2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 20 (Recommendation 23(a)) (incorporating the
no-tipping-off requirements in Recommendation 21).
36.

See Shepherd, Guardians,supra note 16, at 618.

37.

Id. at 635-36 ("Importantly for lawyers, the Paris meeting led to a resolution, if not an uneasy truce, on
the contentious STR issue ....
After considerable debate, FATF and the lawyers resolved the issue by
acknowledging that STRs are not part of risk assessment; rather, STRs represent a response mechanism
once a suspicion of money laundering has been identified. Because of the risk-based approach orientation
of Lawyer Guidance, FATF agreed to language that would not impose a mandatory STR obligation on
legal professionals." (footnotes omitted)).

38.

See, e.g., FATF RBA, supra note 19, at 4-5.
6.

The purpose of this Guidance is to:
Support the development of a common understanding of what the risk-based
approach involves.
Outline the high-level principles involved in applying the risk-based approach.
Indicate good practice in the design and implementation of an effective riskbased approach.

7.

However, it should be noted that applying a risk-based approach is not mandatory.
A properly applied risk-based approach does not necessarily mean a reduced burden,
although it should result in a more cost effective use of resources. For some
countries, applying a rules-based system might be more appropriate. Countries will
need to make their own determinations on whether to apply a risk-based approach,
based on their specific money laundering/terrorist financing risks, size and nature
of the DNFBP activities, and other relevant information. The issue of timing is also
relevant for countries that may have applied anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist
financing (AML/CFT) measures to DNFBPs, but where it is uncertain whether
the DNFBPs have sufficient experience to implement and apply an effective riskbased approach.

Id. (footnotes omitted). Despite the FATF's adoption of a risk-based approach and the FATF RBA,
some countries have adopted more of a rules-based check-off-the-box approach. See generally John A.
Terrill, II & Michael A. Breslow, The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing:"Lessons from the English Approach, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 433 (2014-2015); MacDonald,
supra note 33, at 150 (criticizing the Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) for its rules-based
approach). For additional information about the implementation of the Recommendations with respect
to the legal professions in various countries, see generally Terry, supra note 8, and the International Bar
Association's (IBA) Anti-Money Laundering Forum web page, which is available at: http://www.antimoneylaundering.org.
39.

See U.S. THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 299-303.
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STR, no-tipping-off rules, and the customer due diligence provisions found in the
FATF Recommendations. 40
II. MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING ARE U.S. CRIMES

Money laundering and terrorist financing are serious problems. 4' Even though
42
law enforcement efforts have increased dramatically in the past ten to fifteen years,
40. Id. at 300-01. The following are excerpts related to lawyers from Table 1 in the United States' Third
Mutual Evaluation, where NC means noncompliant and PC means partially compliant:
Frty Rcommen
II TIda1171onR RaIt IngL Summary
)II II I)tt()
of

12. DNFBP - R.5, 6,8-11

NC

unel
CI I iraing,
Iar

* Accountants, dealers in precious metals and stones, lawyers and
real estate agents are not subject to customer identification and
record keeping requirements that meet Recommendations 5
and 10.
* None of the DNFBP sectors is subject to obligations that relate
to Recommendations 6, 8 or 11 (except for casinos in relation
to R.11).

16. DNFBP- R.13-15 &21

NC

* Casinos are the only DNFBP sector that is required to report
suspicious transactions; however, there is a threshold on that
obligation.
* Accountants, lawyers, real estate agents and TCSPs are not subject
to the "tipping off"provision or protected from liability when they
choose to file a suspicious transaction report.
* Accountants, lawyers, real estate agents and TCSPs are not
required to implement adequate internal controls (i.e. [sic]
AML Programs).
* There are no specific obligations on accountants,lawyers, real estate
agents or TCSPs to give special attention to the country advisories
that [the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)] has
issued and which urge enhanced scrutiny of financial transactions
with countries that have deficient AML controls.

24. DNFBP-regulation,
supervision and monitoring

PC

* There is no regulatory oversight for AML/CFT compliance
for accountants, lawyers, real estate agents or TCSPs.

Id.

41.

See, e.g., Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480-84 (2014); Lawton P.
Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother'sKeeper.An EmpiricalStudy ofAttorney Facilitationon Money
LaunderingThrough CommercialTransactions,J.PROF. LAW., 2010, at 6 (2011) ("The International Monetary
Fund ('IMF') estimates that money laundering in a single year accounts for 'between two and five percent
of global gross domestic product, [which] amounts to hundreds of billions, and possibly trillions, of dollars
in criminal proceeds that are annually laundered through the banking system.' The transactions used to
launder the money would be legal, if the money were not derived from criminal activity. Therefore, the
crime of money laundering is aimed at deterring the predicate crimes, as well as protecting the financial
system from abuse." (footnotes omitted)); JAMES K. JACKSON, THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE: AN
OVERVIEW 8 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21904.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015)
("The economic implications of money laundering and terrorist financing pose another set of issues that
argue for gaining greater control over this type of activity. According to the IMF, money laundering
accounts for between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion in economic activity annually."); seealso FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2016 (2012), available at http://
www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/files/Strategic-Plan_2012-2016_508.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).

42.

The USA PATRIOT Act, which was adopted after the September 11, 2001 attacks, significantly increased
the United States' powers with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing. The 2009 Intelligence
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problems remain due to new financing systems and the creativity of those who seek
43
to evade law enforcement measures.
In the United States, several laws address money laundering. For example, the
Money Laundering Control Act makes it illegal to knowingly "(i) conceal or disguise
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under
State or Federal law. 4 4 Lawyers are subject to these requirements 4 and are also among
those subject to Internal Revenue Code § 60501(a), which requires individuals to report
the receipt of more than $10,000 in cash. 46 "Structuring" cash payments to avoid the
$10,000 reporting requirement is also a crime; thus, one could not intentionally deposit
$9,500 and $600 in order to avoid the IRS reporting requirements. 47 Lawyers are
4
among those who may be convicted for violating this provision. 1
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) also increased U.S. powers. See, e.g., Terrill & Breslow,
supra note 38, at 443-44 n.63 (regarding IRTPA); AM. BAR ASS'N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE GATEKEEPER INITIATIVE AND THE VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE 1 [hereinafter
ABA FAQJ, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/
gatekeeper faq.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) ("The United States is a major participant in the FATF
proceedings, and in partial response to the FATF's Recommendations, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act ('PATRIOT Act'), which amended and strengthened certain AML provisions of the
United States Code that originated with the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 ('BSA'). The BSA and, later, certain
provisions of the PATRIOT Act, were directed primarily at banks and other financial institutions.").
43.

44.

See, e.g., Baradaran et al., supra note 41, at 489 ("Traffickers constantly employ the latest technologies to
keep 'one step ahead of law enforcement' efforts."); seealso Saby Ghoshray & Houman Shadab, Remarks
at New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial
System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://www.nylslawreview.com/
financial-action-task-force -program/.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2013); U.S. DEP'T OF
LAUNDERING STRATEGY

94 (2007) [hereinafter 2007

THE TREASURY,

2007 NATIONAL MONEY

NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY],

available at http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/files/nmls-2007.pdf (citing, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§
982, 1956, 1957, and 1960).
45.

See, e.g., Cummings & Stepnowsky, supranote 41, at 26 (noting an empirical study of money laundering
cases in the Second Circuit, finding that "[o]f the ten cases [out of forty money laundering cases] with
lawyer involvement, four of the cases involved lawyer self-directed frauds"). These four lawyers were
defendants in the criminal cases. Id. at 27.

46.

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 60501, 5331 (2012).

47.

See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3), (d)(l)-(2) (2013); seealso 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
STRATEGY, supra note 44, at 94 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5316, 5317, 5324, and 5332 as statutes used to
prosecute defendants). In 2012, a Nevada lawyer was convicted on three counts of structuring financial
transactions in violation of these provisions. See United States v. Wommer, No. 2:10-cr-00596-GMNGWF-1, 2013 WL 7390622 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2013). On December 17, 2013, at the request of the state
bar, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order of temporary suspension and referral to disciplinary board
with respect to this lawyer. See Bar Counsel Report, Supreme Court of Nevada In re: Paul E. Wommer, NEV.
LAW., Feb. 2014, at 36, available at http://nvbar.org/articles/content/bar-counsel-report-february-2014.

48.

See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 494 F. App'x 615 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1299 (2013)
(convicting the lawyer, among other things, of structuring payments); seealso United States v. Sinko,
394 F. App'x 843 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the lawyer's sentence for conspiracy to commit money
laundering and aiding and abetting money laundering for structuring a purchase agreement in a way
that avoided disclosure of cash payments).
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The United States also has adopted, and aggressively enforces, a number of criminal
laws to address the issue of terrorist financing. 49 For example, it is illegal for anyoneincluding lawyers-to engage in commercial or financial transactions with persons or
entities on the government's specially designated nationals list or the U.S. Department
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list. 0 A number of federal
agencies investigate cases of suspected money laundering and terrorist financing,
including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange
Commission, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)."' Statistics in the
National Money Laundering Strategy Report (agovernment document) indicate that
there have been a significant number of investigations, arrests, indictments, convictions,

fines, and restitutions obtained on the basis of the work of a variety of government
entities.5 2 Moreover, the regulatory structure has generated significant private sector
involvement. For example, in 2004, money service businesses filed 296,284 suspicious
activity reports and the securities and futures industry filed 5,705 Reports. 3
49.

See generally 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 44, at 16-19.

50.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains a specially
designated nationals list (SDN), which identifies individuals and entities with whom lawyers and others
may not have commercial or financial transactions. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, SELF REGULATORY BODIES
CALL FOR INFORMATION AND CASES 11 (2012) [hereinafter ABA RESPONSE TO FATF], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2012nov26-gatekeeperreg.
authcheckdam.pdf.
The United States government maintains and enforces an extensive array of legal
restrictions in this regard, including various executive orders issued by the President of
the United States and regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Office of Foreign Assets Control pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 - 1705, that prohibit lawyers and others from engaging
in commercial or financial transactions with such designated persons and entities. See
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
Id. at 11. This document was submitted to the FATF in connection with the preparation of the FATF
Legal Profession Typologies Report. The SDN list is sometimes referred to colloquially as the "OFAC list,"
even though OFAC maintains sanctions lists that are different from the SDN list. See Resource Center:
Specially DesignatedNationalsList (SDN), U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Resource Center: Foreign Sanctions
Evaders (FSE)List, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/
Pages/fse list.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (identifying six OFAC lists, including the SDN list).

51.

See, e.g., 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 44, at 1-11, 97-99 (identifying
various responsibilities and goals).

52.

Id. at 89-95.

53.

See id. at 86. The FATF has defined money service businesses as follows:
According to the generally accepted definition, money service businesses (MSBs) are
non-bank financial institutions that provide certain types of financial services. Although
the precise scope of the activities that fall into category "money service" vary from country
to country (for example, the requirements for MSBs may only apply if the value of
individual transactions and/or its turnover exceeds a certain value limit. They may also
only apply to businesses that carry out the specified activities on regular basis or as an
organised business concern, etc.).
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U.S. lawyers are among those who have been convicted of money laundering and
terrorist financing. 4 Some lawyers appear to have masterminded the money
laundering schemes,55 while others appear to have been brought into these criminal
schemes by their clients or other associates.5 6 Make no mistake, however, these
lawyers are criminals and their convictions demonstrate that lawyers are subject to
U.S. criminal law. The FATF's Legal Professionals Typologies Report suggests that
the United States has been more aggressive than many countries in prosecuting
lawyers for money laundering and terrorist financing violations.57

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH MONEY REMITTANCE AND CURRENCY

EXCHANGE PROVIDERS 77 (June 2010), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/ML /20

through%20Remittance%20and%20Currency%20Exchange%20Providers.pdf (citations omitted). For
the U.S. definition, see 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) and Money Services Businesses, FIN. CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/financial-institutions/msb/definitions/msb.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
54. See, e.g., In re Blair, 40 A.3d 883 (D.C. 2012) (disbarring an attorney convicted of money laundering,
witness tampering, and obstruction of justice because obstruction of justice and witness tampering
constituted moral turpitude per se); In re Tezak, 898 A.2d 383 (D.C. 2006) (lawyer disbarred); In re
Abbell, 814 A.2d 961 (D.C. 2003) (lawyer disbarred); United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991 (11th Cir.
2001) (affirming lawyer's money laundering conviction); In re Lee, 755 A.2d 1034 (D.C. 2000) (lawyer
disbarred); In re Toussaint, 753 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. 2014) (per curiam) (describing a lawyer's voluntary
surrender of law license due to his violation of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.15 as
"tantamount to disbarment"); Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Stern, 830 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 2013)
(suspending lawyer for two years as a result of his complicity in client's bankruptcy fraud, which resulted
in the lawyer's criminal conviction of money laundering and sentence of one year, one day); see also
Discipline: Cheryl B. Chadwick, OR. ST. B. BULL., available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/
bulletin/07jun/discipline.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). Two recent cases from Nevada show the
interrelationship of the criminal law and discipline. See Bar Counsel Report, Supreme Court of Nevada In
re: Paul E. Wommer, NEV. LAW. 36 (Feb. 2014), available at http://nvbar.org/articles/content/barcounsel-report-february-2014; Martha Neil, Lawyer Takes Plea in Money-Laundering Case Linked to
ConvictedEx-client'sPonzi Scheme, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 24, 2014) (describing the conviction of Nevada lawyer
Christopher Reade and noting the then-upcoming May 2, 2014 sentencing), available at http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer-takes-plea in money-laundering-case-linked to convicted_
ex-client/; Jeff German, Las Vegas Lawyer Pleads Guilty in Money Laundering Scheme, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Jan. 22, 2014) ("State Bar Counsel David Clark said he would file a petition asking the Nevada
Supreme Court to temporarily suspend Reade's license until the bar takes action."), available at http://
www.reviewjournal.com/news/ias-vegas-lawyer-pleads-guilty-money-laundering-scheme; see also cases
cited infra note 57
55.

See Cummings & Stepnowsky, supra note 41, at 26; In re Blair,40 A.3d 883.

56. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 54.
57.

See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF REPORT: MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
VULNERABILITIES OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 30 (2013) [hereinafter TYPOLOGIES REPORT], available at

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%/20and%/2TF%/20vulnerabilities /20
legal%20professionals.pdf ("Criminal prosecutions were started in sixteen countries, with Austria,
Spain, Italy, and Poland joining the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaching
double figures of prosecutions in the last five years."); see also U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS: COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, KEEPING FOREIGN
CORRUPTION OUT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUR CASE HISTORIES (2010), available at http://www.
hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-psi-staff-report-keeping-foreign-corruption-out-of-the-unitedstates-four-case-histories (cited in the FATF Typologies Report).
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In addition to criminal penalties, lawyers are subject to professional discipline
and may lose their licenses if they counsel or assist a client to engage in criminal,
fraudulent, or other conduct reflecting adversely on their fitness to practice law. 8 In
The U.S. cases cited in the FATF Typologies Report included twenty-nine U.S. criminal
prosecution or discipline cases against lawyers. TYPOLOGIES REPORT, supra, at 39-146. Because these
cases were spread out over more than one-hundred pages, and because the report did not provide full
citations for some of these cases, the U.S. cases found in the FATF Typologies Report are listed below,
with the FATF report case number appearing in brackets following the citation: United States v. Jarrett,
494 F. App'x 615 (7th Cir. 2012) [Case 5]; In re Blair, 40 A.3d 883 (D.C. 2012) [Case 123]; United States
v. Sinko, 394 F. App'x 843 (3d Cir. 2010) [Case 61]; United States v. Monea, 376 F. App'x 531 (6th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 356 (2010) [Case 27]; United States v. Crawford, 281 F. Appx 444 (6th Cir.
2008) [Case 118]; United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1280
(2008) [Case 106]; United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1046 (2006)
[Case 113]; United States v. Elso, 422 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2005) [Case 119]; United States v. Robertson,
67 F. Appx 257 (6th Cir. 2003), subsequent appeal remanded by sub nom. United States v. Rorrer, 161 F.
App'x 518 (6th Cir. 2005) [Case 60]; In re Abbell, 814 A.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [Case 45]; United
States v. Oberhauser, 284 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002) [Case 112]; United
States v. Nolan Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) [Case 105]; United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245
(3d Cir. 1996) [Case 29]; United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998
(1992) [Case 62]; United States v. George, 839 F. Supp. 2d. 430 (D. Mass. 2012) [Case 35]; United States
v. Harmon, No. CR 08-00938JW, 2011 WL 7937876 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011), rev'd, 537 F. App'x 719
(9th Cir. 2013) (reversing a district court order for a new trial, finding harmless error) [Case 57]; United
States v. Abramoff, No. 06-cr-00001(ESH), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119614 (D.D.C. July 14, 2014)
[Case 49]; United States v. Ferguson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2000) [Case 46]; United States v.
Nesser, 939 F. Supp. 417 (W.D. Pa. 1996) [Case 73]; United States v. Foster, 868 F. Supp. 213 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) [Case 59]; United States v. One White Crystal Covered Bad Tour Glove, No. 11-cv-3528
(C.D. Cal.) andUnitedStates v. One Gulfstream G-VJet Aircraft, No. 11-cv-1874 (D.D.C.), reso/vedby
settlement, United States v. One Michael Jackson Signed Thriller Jacket, No. 2:13-cv-09169-GW-SS
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2014) [Case 32]; United States v. Delgado, No. 3:12-cr-02106-DB (W.D. Tex.),
United States v. Delgado, No. 3:13-cr-00370-DB (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013), and United States v.
FirstCaribbean Int'l Bank Account No. 10286872, No. EP 12-cv-0479 (W.D. Tex.) [Case 104]; United
States v. Bristol, No. 10-cr-1239 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011) [Case 58]; Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Dixon, 373 S.W.3d
444 (Ky. 2012) [Case 3]; In re Shepherd, 91 So. 3d 283 (La. 2012) [Case 117].
58.

See, e.g., TYPOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 57, at 30 ("[T]en countries provided advice about disciplinary
action taken, however the number of disciplinary cases reported exceeded double figures only in the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States."). The discipline rules that apply in the
United States are the state equivalents of American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(a), and 8.4. Under Model Rule 8.4, it is misconduct for a lawyer to, intera/ia:
"(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another
to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2014).

Violating Rule 8.4 subjects a lawyer to discipline, including possible license revocation. Id. at cmt. 1.
Rule 1.2(d) provides: "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law." Id. R. 1.2(d). Rule 1.16(a) provides in part:
"Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law ....
Id. R. 1.16(a). Rule 1.16(c) requires a
lawyer to "comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating
a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation." Id. R. 1.16(c) (2013). The exception in
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the United States, lawyer discipline is handled in a proceeding that is separate from
a criminal prosecution. 9
In sum, lawyers who are engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing, or
who are intentionally assisting a client in such activities, are subject to both criminal
60
and disciplinary sanctions.
III. U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERROIST FINANCING

A. Why the Focus Is on Lawyers Who Unwittingly Assist Money Laundering
The U.S. legal profession supports the government's efforts to fight money
laundering and combat terrorist financing. Each gatekeeper resolution adopted by
the ABA begins with a paragraph expressing the ABA's commitment to support all
reasonable and necessary efforts made by the U.S. government to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing. 6' The reports accompanying the ABA resolutions
have referenced the National Money Laundering Strategy Report, thus highlighting
62
the seriousness of money laundering and terrorist financing issues.
While it is regrettable that any U.S. lawyer has been implicated in such schemes,
whenever you have a group of individuals-even professionals-some of them may
intentionally violate the law. If the vast network of federal criminal laws and

enforcement mechanisms are insufficient to deter intentional criminal acts by
Rule 1.16(c) will likely be inapplicable. See FATF RBA, supra note 19; see also John A. Terrill, II &
Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Dimensions of Client Due Diligence, in Kevin L. Shepherd, THE GATEKEEPER
INITIATIVE AND THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE (forthcoming 2015).
59. See, e.g., Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, AM. B. AsS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professio nal-responsibility/resou rces/lawyer-ethics-regul atio n/mo del-rules for lawyer
disciplinary-enforcement.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
60.

See supra notes 54, 58 and accompanying text.

61.

See, e.g., AM.

BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON GATEKEEPER REGULATION & THE PROFESSION, SECTION OF

REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, SECTION OF LITIG., SECTION OF

(2003), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/eadership/recommendations03/104.authcheckdam.pdf
("RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the enactment of reasonable and balanced
initiatives designed to detect and prevent domestic and international money laundering and terrorist
financing."); AM. BAR ASS'N, ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 300 OPPOSING
INT'L LAW & PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

FEDERAL BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

(2008) [hereinafter ABA

RESOLUTION

300], available at http://

www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2008 am 300.authcheckdam.pdf
("RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports all reasonable and necessary efforts of the
United States government and the international community to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing activity in the international financial systemL]"); AM. BAR ASS'N, ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 116 ADOPTING THE VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR
AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2010)
[hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION 116], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/116.authcheckdam.pdf ("RESOLVED, That the American Bar
Association acknowledges and supports United States Government efforts to combat money laundering
and terrorist financing[]").
LAWYERS TO DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING

62.

See, e.g., ABA RESOLUTION 116, supra note 61, at 2; ABA RESOLUTION 300, supra note 61, at 4.
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lawyers, it is unlikely that any additional efforts by the profession would deter such
conduct. 6 Accordingly, the legal profession can have the greatest impact if it helps
lawyers avoid unwittingly assisting clients who are engaged in money laundering or
64
terrorist financing.
The legal profession has determined that the most effective way it can educate
lawyers to avoid unwitting involvement is by helping them understand the ways in
which sophisticated criminals might use them to facilitate their crimes. While most
(if not all) lawyers know the black-letter rule that they may not assist or counsel a
client regarding criminal activities, many lawyers may not yet recognize the types of
fact patterns that suggests these crimes are underway. In other words, lawyers know
6
the "rule," but they need to learn more about these kinds of "application" issues.
As part of their educational efforts, U.S. legal organizations have strongly
encouraged U.S. lawyers to employ the FATF-approved risk-based approachparticularly during the client intake stage. The U.S. approach encourages the
profession to do more than mechanically "check off a box" or apply a set of formal
requirements (or have a staff assistant do so). It seeks to change the culture in order
to make lawyers as sensitive to these issues as they are to conflicts of interest. The
focus of a risk-based approach is to have lawyers thoughtfully evaluate the
63.

See supra notes 54, 57, 58 and accompanying text.

64.

See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 98 n.54 ("The endorsement by the ABA of the Good Practices
Guidance responds to requests by FATF, Congress, and federal regulators for guidance to the legal
profession" that uses a risk-based approach). On the other hand, the legal profession has frequently
pointed out to the FATF that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that lawyers' unwitting
involvement in money laundering or terrorist financing is a widespread problem. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF
BARS &LAW

SOCIETIES OF EUR., RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION: THE REVIEW OF THE THIRD ANTI-

DIRECTIVE 6, § 3.2 (2010), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/EN_211011_CCBERespol_1319525363.pdf.
Although there has been no empirical evidence suggesting widespread unwitting involvement by
lawyers, it certainly remains a possibility. While the legal profession is committed to doing its part
concerning these criminal activities, it has called for an appropriate balance on the part of the FATF
and its members when implementing the Recommendations for the legal profession. As recognized in
the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of the Lawyer and in other documents, the legal
profession plays a unique role with respect to the rule of law and administration ofjustice. Implementation
efforts that undermine lawyer independence and attorney-client confidentiality and privilege need to be
carefully considered so they do not have a deleterious effect on the administration of justice, particularly
when there has been no empirical evidence of widespread unwitting involvement of lawyers in money
laundering and terrorism financing schemes. See generally id. The importance of these issues was
recognized in a British Columbia decision in which the Province's highest court affirmed the lower
court decision that the government's money laundering regime was invalid, reasoning that the
independence of the bar was a principle of fundamental justice with which the Regime interfered to an
unacceptable degree. See generally Fed'n of Law Soc'ys of Can. v. Canada, 2013 BCCA 147. The result
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, although the reasoning differed. Fed'n of Law Soc'ys of
Can. v. Canada, 2015 S.CC. 7.
MONEY LAUNDERING

65.

As is described in greater detail infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text, the legal profession had urged
the FATF to focus on unwitting lawyer involvement in its Typologies Report. The report, however,
focused on existing case studies and thus on intentional wrongdoing. As a result, the ABA, CCBE, and
IBA commissioned their own Typologies Report that focused on unwitting involvement, rather than
intentional wrongdoing. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
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circumstances of the representation in order to make an informed decision about
whether to proceed. 66 The following section identifies some of the educational efforts
that have been undertaken to help lawyers understand these application issues and to
foster this cultural change.
B. Efforts Undertaken to Educate US. LawyersAbout How They Might Unwittingly
FacilitateMoney Launderingor TerroristFinancing

A number of legal organizations have been heavily involved in the efforts to educate
U.S. lawyers about money laundering and terrorist financing.67 The deployed efforts
include the development of policy statements,'6 continuing legal education (CLE)
sessions, 69 articles,70 casebook discussions, 7' and state bar web page articles or links.72
66.

See, e.g., Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 94; see also MacDonald, supra note 33, at 150 (criticizing the
FLSC rule for abandoning a risk-based approach and suggesting that a different direction was warranted).

67.

The organizations that have been most active include the ABA, many of its sections, and its Task Force
on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession; The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel
(ACTEC), which co-sponsored the New York Law School FATF symposium; the American College of
Real Estate Lawyers; the American College of Mortgage Attorneys; and the American College of
Commercial Finance Lawyers. There are a handful of individuals within these organizations who
deserve to be recognized for the countless pro bono hours they have devoted to educating U.S. lawyers
regarding these issues. Several of these individuals spoke at the New York Law School symposium,
including Kevin Shepherd, Duncan Osborne, and John Terrill. See generally New York Law School
FATF Symposium, supra note 1.

68.

See supra note 61 (citing ABA Resolutions 104, 116, and 300).

69.

See infra notes 74-77 (citing, respectively, continuing legal education (CLE) sessions directed towards
real estate lawyers, trusts and estates lawyers, and lawyers who form corporations).

70. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 8, 23 (citing law review articles); infra note 83 (citing articles that appeared in the
ABAJournal).
71.

See infra notes 79, 80, 127 and accompanying text (regarding the efforts to include this information in
law school casebooks and in education materials for lawyer regulators).

72.

See, e.g., ALA. STATE BAR, THE GATEKEEPER INITIATIVE-ONE FORM OF ASSISTANCE TO LEGAL
PROFESSION: ADDENDUM 5 (June 2013), https://www.alabar.org/assets/uploads/2014/09/une-2013addendum rev4.pdf; Good PracticesPrevent Money Launderingand Terrorist Financing,ST. B. ARIZONA,
http://www.azbar.org/lawyerregulation/rulesandotherresources/goodpracticespreventmoneylaundering
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Andrew Tuft & Rachel Chapman, Beware ofHelping Finance Terrorists, CAL.
ST. Bj. (Apr. 10, 2011), available at http://apps.calbar.ca.gov/mcleselfstudy/mcle-home.aspx?testID 55;
Paula Frederick, Moneyfor Nothing, 18 GA. Bj. 50 (Aug. 2012); LegalLinks: Gatekeeper,MD. ST. B. ASS'N,
http://www.msba.org/resources/legallinks.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Money Laundering & Terrorist
Financing,MINN. BENCH & B., http://mnbenchbar.com/2012/12/moneylaundering/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2015); Voluntary Good Practicesto Combat Money Launderingand TerroristFinancing,Mo. B., http://www.
mobar.org/practice-resources/voluntary-good-practices-to-combat-money-laundering-and-terroristfinancing.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to Combat Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing, ST. B. NEVADA, http://www.nvbar.org/content/voluntary-good-practicesguidance -combat-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Task Force on
Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession, ST. B. NEW MEXICO, http://www.nmbar.org/AboutSBNM/
gatekeeper.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good PracticesGuidance to Combat Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing, ST. B. AsS'N NORTH DAKOTA, https://sband.org/News/NewsDetail.
aspx?Newsld 643 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Notice on the ABA Task Force on GatekeeperRegulation andthe
Profession, 2013, PA. B. AsS'N, http://www.pabar.org/public/sections/rlpropco/gatekeeper.asp (last visited
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Many of the educational efforts have targeted lawyers engaged in the five specified
activities listed in Recommendation 22." For example, efforts have been made to reach
76
75
74
lawyers who handle real estate matters, trusts and estates, international practice,
Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good PracticesGuidancefor Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing,S.C. B., http://www.scbar.org/News/NewsDetails/ArticleId/1575/Voluntary-GoodPractices- Guidance-to -Combat-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorist-Financing.aspx (last visited Apr. 10,
2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to Combat Money Laundering and TerroristFinancing, ST. B.
SOUTH DAKOTA, http://www.sdbar.org/new/members/gatekeeper.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015);
Voluntary Good Practicesto Combat Money Laundering and TerroristFinancing, ST. B. TEXAS, http://www.
texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section ResourceGuides&Template /CM/HTMLDisplay.
cfm&ContentID 18944 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to Combat Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, VA. ST. B., http://www.vsb.org/site/news/item/voluntary-goodpractices-ABA-2012 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
In addition to these web pages, members of the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force have previously
noted web pages for the District of Columbia, Connecticut, Florida, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming, however the links have either been changed or eliminated.
73.

See 2012 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 19-20 (identifying the five specified activities); seealso
supra note 29 and accompanying text.

74.

Examples of articles include Shepherd, Guardians,supra note 16 (article published in the Real Property,
Trust andEstateLaw Journal),and Kevin L. Shepherd, Ethically Speaking... Just WhatAre My Obligations
Under the Gatekeeper Initiative?, 27 PROB. & PROP. MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2013, at 43, available at http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/probate-property-magazine-2012/2013/septemberoctober_2013/2013_aba-rpte-pp v27 5 article-shephert-gatekeeper-initiative.htm. Examples of
CLE sessions include: Pa. Bar Inst., The Gatekeeper Initiative: Are You Unwittingly Helping Your
Clients Launder Money?, 17th Annual Real Estate Conference (Dec. 6, 2013); Am. Coll. of Mortg.
Attorneys, Risky Business: Are You Unwittingly Helping Your Clients Launder Money? (Sept. 27,
2013); seealso ABA RESPONSE TO FATF, supra note 50, at 21-32 (Exhibit A cites educational efforts).

75.

See, e.g., FATF and Circular 230: The Expanding Impact of Federal Initiatives on Legal Ethics,
ACTEC 2012 Annual Meeting (March 7-8, 2013); The Financial Action Task Force and the Good
Practices Guidance: The Impact on Trust and Estate Lawyers, Cal. B. Ass'n (Jan. 19, 2013);
International Planning Update/FATF & the Global Forum, 47th Annual Heckerling Inst. on Estate
Planning (Jan. 12-16, 2013); The Financial Action Task Force and the Good Practices Guidance, 10th
Annual Sophisticated Trusts & Estates Law Inst. (Nov. 8-9,2012); FATF Tutorial Workshop, ACTEC
Fall Meeting (Oct. 19-20, 2012); Ethics in Offshore Planning, Am. Law Inst.: Int'l Trust & Estate
Planning (Aug. 23-24, 2012); Wealth Planning for High Net-Worth Individuals and Owners of
Closely-Held Companies, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Continuing & Prof'l Studies, Summer Inst. in Tax'n (July
25-26, 2012); Guidance on Good Practices to Combat Money Laundering, Soc'y of Trust & Estate
Practitioners (STEP) (Mar. 11, 2011); seealso ABA RESPONSE TO FATF, supra note 50, at 21-32
(Exhibit A cites educational efforts).

76.

See, e.g., Mikhail Reider-Gordon & Truman Kirkland Butler, Anti-Money Laundering, 46 INT'L LAW.
375 (2012); The New FATF Recommendations and the AML/CTF Methodology, Am. Bar Ass'n
Section of Int'l Law Int'l Anti-Money Laundering Comm. (May 6, 2014) (A non-CLE teleconference
and in-person program); Int'l Anti-Money Laundering Comm., AM. B. AsS'N, http://apps.americanbar.
org/dch/committee.cfm?com IC700500 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (including many useful links). U.S.
lawyers and academics have also been very active in the IBAs efforts to educate lawyers about money
laundering. For example, Professor Clark Cunningham has spoken on this topic at IBA Conferences,
assembled materials, and even prepared a video for the IBA. See IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum
Website Updates Dec 2011, INT'L B. ASS'N, http://www.ibanet.org/ENews Archive/
IBA_12December_2011_AntiMoneyLaunderingForum-website-updates.aspx (last visited Apr. 10,
2015). Professor Cunningham is the executive director of Georgia State's National Institute for
Teaching Ethics & Professionalism (NIFTEP) and is the creator of the International Forum on
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and corporate formation and management.77 There also have been concerted efforts to
educate ethics experts, such as general counsel in law firms78 and legal ethics
academics,7 9 since they provide advice regarding risk management and rule compliance.
The goal is to have a "cradle-to-grave" approach to education that begins in law school 0
and concludes by educating the regulators responsible for disciplining lawyers. 8' State
supreme court chief justices have also been included in the educational efforts,82 and
additional audiences have been reached by publishing articles in the ABA Journal sent
83
to all ABA members.
When educating the constituencies listed above, one of the primary tools is the
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing ("Guidance"), which took more than a year to

Teaching Legal Ethics and Professionalism. For a wealth of additional information, see Anti-Money
Laundering Forum, INT'L B. ASS'N, http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015),
and Terry, supra note 8, at 20-27 (summarizing the data found in the IBA's 2010 Global Chart).
77. See, e.g., Tuft & Chapman, supra note 72 (online CLE session); An Update on the FATF Guidancefor
Legal Professionals and Development of Good Practice Guidelines, COM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n Sec. of
Bus. Law, Jan. 2009, at 39, availableat http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL190000pub/
newsletter/200901/all.pdf; Message from the Chair, Linda Hayman, AM. B. AsS'N SEC. Bus. L., Apr.
2007, 1-2, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0058/materials/print.pdf; see also ABA
RESPONSE TO FATF, supra note 50, at 21-32 (Exhibit A cites educational efforts).
78. See, e.g., Hot to Pot: Money Laundering, Formal Opinion 463, andLegalMarjuana,AM. B. AsS'N, http://
www.americanbar.org/content/aba/calendar/2014/05/40th-aba-national-conference-on-professionalresponsibility/conferencematerials/session5.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); AM. BAR ASS'N, FORMAL
OPINION 463: CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2013)
[hereinafter FORMAL OPINION 463], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional-responsibility/formal-opinion_463 .authcheckdam.pdf.
79. See, e.g., 20lOFATFSymposium,J. PROF. LAw., 2010, at 1, availableat http://www.anti-moneylaundering.
org/2010_FATFSymposium.aspx (This symposium is discussed infra note 126). The International
Forum on Teaching Legal Ethics and Professionalism has collected resources on money laundering from
legal academics from around the world, including materials from the 2012 money laundering session held
in Banff at the conference immediately preceding the International Legal Ethics Conference VI. See, e.g.,
Money Laundering, INT'L FORUM ON TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS & PROFESSIONALISM, http://www.

teachinglegalethics.org/category/teaching-topics/money-laundering (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
80.

The author has personal knowledge of the fact that U.S. Department of the Treasury officials have met
with several different chairs of the Association of American Law Schools' (AALS) Section on
Professional Responsibility, including Professors Jack Sahl and Peter Margulies. The chairs have also
met with representatives of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession. One of
the goals of these meetings has been to encourage legal ethics academics to include more of this material
in their classes and casebooks.

81.

See Nat'l Org. of Bar Counsel, Program of the Midyear Meeting in New Orleans (Feb. 1-4, 2012)
(including a Plenary session entitled "Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing").

82.

See Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 98 n.55 and accompanying text.

83.

See, e.g., Michael A. Lindenberger, Into the Breach: Voluntary Compliance on Money Laundering Gets a
Boost from the ABA and Treasury, 97 A.B.A. J. 56 (Oct. 2011); David L. Hudson, Jr., ABA Endorses
Guidancefor Lawyers on Fighting Money Laundering and TerroristFinancing, 99 A.B.A. J. 64 (Sept.
2013); ABA FAQ, supra note 42.
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develop 4 and has been formally endorsed by a number of U.S. legal organizations,
including the ABA itself and the Conference of Chief Justices."
As noted earlier, the FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals invited
countries to develop guidance for their lawyers. 8 6 The Guidance represents the U.S.
legal profession's response and provides more detailed information than is found in
the FATF RBA.8 7
Similar to the FATF RBA, the Guidance recommends that, during the client
intake process, a lawyer consider questions about the nature of the client, the
countries involved, and the type of service a client requests.88 The degree of due
diligence that a lawyer performs should be determined by these client, geography,
and service risk-factors.89

84.

See, e.g., Shepherd, Guardians,supra note 16, at 662-63 nn.307-11 and accompanying text; see also ABA
RESOLUTION 300, supra note 61 (2008 ABA Resolution calling for the development of the Guidance);
ABA RESOLUTION 116, supra note 61 (August 2010 endorsement of the Guidance); AM. BAR ASS'N,
VOLUNTARY

GOOD

PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS

LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

(2010) [hereinafter

TO

DETECT AND

COMBAT MONEY

GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE], available

at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal-justice/voluntary-goodpractices-guidance.authcheckdam.pdf. It should be noted that the development of the Guidance and
the other efforts have not been entirely altruistic and directed towards stopping money laundering and
terrorist financing. They were also undertaken in the hope that steps such as this would make federal
legislation unnecessary. See, e.g., Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 97.
85.

The Guidance was formally endorsed or approved by all of the entities whose representatives participated
in its development, the ABA Section of Law Practice Management, and the ABA itself. See GooD
PRACTICES GUIDANCE, supra note 84, at 1; ABA RESOLUTION 116, supra note 61, at 3. For information
about the Conference of ChiefJustices' endorsement, see infra note 98.

86.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

87.

See generally GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE, Supra note 84; see also Shepherd RBA, supra note 6, at 96
("[The FATF RBA] offers little practical guidance to U.S. lawyers."). The Guidance includes Practice
Pointers and a Client Intake Appendix. The Client Intake Appendix can be found on The American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel's web site, which is available at: http://www.actec.org/public/
GovernmentalRelations/VoluntaryGoodPractices.asp. The Appendix to this article provides a
summary of the ABA Guidance and cites the page numbers on which the practice pointers are found.
One example of a practice pointer states:
Practicepointer: For example, a general practitioner in rural Montana would have no
reason to engage in extensive due diligence or know your client measures . . . if a long
term client called the lawyer and asked her to form a limited liability company for the
purpose of buying a ranch. However, if that same lawyer received a call from a new and
unknown client saying that the client had just won several million dollars at poker in
Nevada and needed the lawyer to form a limited liability company to buy a ranch, then
a risk based approach would suggest that in this latter case, more extensive due diligence
and know your client measures would be appropriate.
GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE, supra note 84, at 8.

88.

Compare FATF RBA, supra note 19, at
106 (identifying geography, service, and client risks), with
GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE, supra note 84, at 15 ("The Lawyer Guidance identifies three major risk
categories with regard to legal engagements: (a) country/geographic risk, (b) service risk, and (c) client
risk.").

89.

GooD PRACTICES GUIDANCE, supra note 84, at 27-33.
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As is true with the conflicts of interest analysis that a lawyer performs at the outset
of a client matter, the level and nature of the lawyer's gatekeeper inquiry varies with the
circumstances. For example, the Guidance indicates that the standard due diligence a
lawyer performs may sometimes need to be adjusted upwards depending on the number
and nature of the risk factors. 90 Where enhanced due diligence is appropriate, the
Guidance identifies additional steps that lawyers could find useful. 9' Thus, a lawyer
may want to ensure that for certain types of high-risk clients there is peer or managerial
oversight regarding a lawyer's decision to accept a client. 92
In addition to noting the circumstances in which enhanced due diligence would
be appropriate, the Guidance also sets forth circumstances in which a reduced level of
due diligence might be appropriate. 93 For example, reduced levels of due diligence may
be appropriate for publicly listed companies or clients, such as banks, that already are
94
subject to extensive anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing rules.
This section of the Guidance also presents thirteen variables that may change the
analysis, including the length of time the lawyer has known the client.95 These due
diligence efforts are designed to help lawyers make a thorough and informed decision
about whether it is appropriate to proceed with (or continue) representing a client. If a
lawyer concludes that a client wants to use the lawyer to facilitate money laundering
or terrorist financing, that lawyer should decline (or terminate) the representation.96

90.

Id. at 28-32. The Guidance provides a list of ten factors that may lead one to conclude that there is a
heightened level of risk associated with the client. Id. at 17-21. The Guidance also identified fourteen
types of "service" that could lead a lawyer to conclude that there is a heightened level of risk. Id. at 21-28.
With respect to geographic risk, the Guidance recommends that lawyers consult credible sources, which
include "information that is produced by well-known bodies that generally are regarded as reputable and
that make such information publicly and widely available. Examples of credible sources include the FATF,
the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, FinCEN, OFAC, and the U.S. Department of
State." Id. at 16. See also discussion supra note 50 regarding the SDN list produced by OFAC. The 2008
FATF RBA, like the Guidance, noted that the level of due diligence may need to be adjusted upwards
depending on client, service, or geographic risks. See, e.g., FATF RBA, supranote 19, at
111-13.

91.

GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE,

92.

Id. at 33.

93.

Id. at 28-32.

94.

Id. at 36.

95.

Id. at 28-32. This section of the Guidance identified the following variable that might affect a lawyer's
analysis of the risk involved: (1) the nature of the client relationship; (2) existing regulation; (3)
reputation and publicly available information; (4) regularity/duration of relationship; (5) familiarity with
country/laws; (6) duration/magnitude of attorney-client relationship; (7) local counsel; (8) geographic
disparity; (9) one-shot transactions; (10) technological developments favoring anonymity; (11) client
origination/referral source; (12) structure of client/transaction; (13) trusts that are pension funds. Id.

96.

Id. at 34, 37 ("The fundamental starting point for implementing a risk-based approach is for the lawyer
to make an overall risk assessment of the client. Most lawyers perform elements of that assessment as
part of their established client intake and conflicts review system ....
Not every risk-based approach
analysis of apotentialclient wi// inexorably leadto the conclusion that, with appropriatecontrols, the lawyer can
accept and proceed with the proposed engagement. It may be possible that the lawyer's analysis will lead the
lawyer to reject the engagement or to withdrawfrom the representation.") (emphasis added).

supra note 84, at 32-34.
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The U.S. legal profession worked closely with the U.S. Department of the
Treasury when developing the Guidance. Although Treasury had not previously
endorsed a private-industry group-policy statement, it supported the Guidance and
Treasury's statement of support was included in the materials distributed to the ABA
House of Delegates prior to its approval of the Guidance. 97 In 2014, the Conference
of Chief Justices endorsed the Guidance.98
The Guidance has been prominently featured at a number of CLE sessions,99 but
the efforts to publicize the Guidance have gone even further. For example, the ABA
Gatekeeper Task Force prepared a Frequently Asked Questions document to make the
Guidance more accessible.10 The ABA has asked bar associations to place the Guidance
on their web sites,'' and the Task Force has persuaded the ABAJournal to publish
several stories that reference it. 0 2 Task Force members have encouraged professional
responsibility academics to teach this material to law students and to include this
material in ethics casebooks.' 3 Members have promised to provide hypothetical
problems (with a suggested Teacher's Guide) that academics may use to introduce their
students to the Guidance. 0 4 They also convinced the ABA to publish a book on
gatekeeper issues; this book should become available in 2015 and will include
97.

See ABA RESOLUTION 116, supra note 61, app. at 3 ("STATEMENT FROM UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY[:] The Treasury Department welcomes this Good Practices paper
as a useful step in protecting the legal profession as well as the broader financial system from the risks
of money laundering and terrorist financing. Treasury looks forward to continuing engagement with the
ABA to facilitate implementation of effective policies and procedures to protect against money
laundering and terrorist financing.").

98.

See

CONFERENCE

OF

CHIEF JUSTICES,

RESOLUTION

7: IN

SUPPORT

OF

THE VOLUNTARY

GOOD

PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST

FINANCING (2014), availableat http://ccj.ncsc.org/-/media/microsites/files/ccj/resolutions/07232014-

support-of-voluntary-good-practices-for-lawyers.ashx.
99.

See supra notes 75-78 for a list of some of these CLE sessions. There is also a useful list in the ABA
RESPONSE TO FATF, supra note 50, at 21-32.

100. AM. BAR ASS'N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GATEKEEPER INITIATIVE AND THE
VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/criminaljustice/gatekeeper-faq.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
101. See, e.g., Letter from Laurel G. Bellows, Am. Bar Ass'n President, to State and Local Bars (July 31,
2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013ju131_
abaformalopinion463_l.authcheckdam.pdf (urging states to educate their members in various ways,
including through their web page and by providing resources); Letter from Stephen N. Zack, Am. Bar
Ass'n President, to State and Local Bars (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011apr08_goodpractices
o.authcheckdam.pdf (encouraging
states to distribute and post the ABA Guidance on their web pages).
102. See Lindenberger, supra note 83; Hudson, supra note 83.
103. The author has personal knowledge that Kevin Shepherd, chair of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper
Regulation and the Profession, has met with successive chairs of the AALS's Section on Professional
Responsibility. In addition, a representative from Treasury was encouraged to (and did) attend the 37th
National Conference on Professional Responsibility, which was held in 2011 in Memphis, Tennessee
under the auspices of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility. See supra note 80.
104. The author has participated in conversations on this topic.
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information on the Guidance.' 5 In short, the Guidance has proved to be a lynchpin in
the efforts to educate U.S. lawyers on money laundering and terrorist financing.
A formal ethics opinion issued by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility has also begun to play a leading role in educational
efforts. 0 6 Members of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the
Profession requested an opinion from the Standing Committee to assist them in
their efforts to educate U.S. lawyers.'0 7 These efforts came to fruition in 2013 when
the Standing Committee issued ABA Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence,
Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing.' 8 This opinion confirms that lawyers
using the risk-based control measures detailed in the Guidance are acting in a manner
09
consistent with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
A third document that is expected to play a central role in educating U.S. lawyers
is the Lawyer's Guide Report issued by the ABA, the Council of Bars and Law
Societies of Europe (CCBE), and the International Bar Association (IBA),"10 which
was released in October 2014 during the IBA Annual Meeting in Tokyo."'
The history of the Lawyer's Guide is interesting. In 2013, the FATF published a
Typologies Report for the legal profession,"12 along with reports for other sectors," 3
which "identifies a number of [money laundering and terrorist financing] methods that4
commonly employ or, in some countries, require the services of a legal professional."
Prior to issuing this report, legal profession representatives advised the FATF that the
105. See Kevin L. Shepherd, THE GATEKEEPER INITIATIVE AND THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO CLIENT
DUE DILIGENCE (forthcoming 2015).

106. FORMAL OPINION 463, supra note 78 (discussing client due diligence, money laundering, and terrorist
financing).
107. The author has personal knowledge of these facts. See also Dennis Rendleman, Counsel to the ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Remarks at the 40th National Conference on Professional
Responsibility (May 30, 2014).
108. See FORMAL

OPINION

463, supra note 78.

109. Id.
110. SeeINT'L BAR ASS'N, AM. BAR ASS'N, &COUNCIL OF BARS &LAw Soc'Ys OF EUR., A LAWYER'S GUIDE
TO DETECTING AND PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERING (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter LAWYER'S GUIDE],

available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct-abaguidepreventingmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf.
111. See What's New in Washington, AM. B. AsS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmentallegislativework/new.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (follow "Read more..." hyperlink under "October
2014: ABA, IBA, and CCBE Release Lawyer's Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering").
112. See TYPOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 57.

113. See, e.g.,

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING THROUGH TRADE

IN DIAMONDS (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML-TF-

through-trade-in-diamonds.pdf;

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE ROLE OF HAWALA AND OTHER SIMILAR

(Oct. 2013), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/f"atf/documents/reports/Role-of-hawala-and-similar-in-ml-tf.pdf.
SERVICE PROVIDERS IN MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

114. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODS AND TRENDS: MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING VULNERABILITIES OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS

4 (June 2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafl.

org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML20and20TF20vulnerabilities201egalo20professionals.pdf.
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report would be most useful if it focused on unwitting involvement by lawyers, rather
than intentional criminal activity."5 Despite the legal profession's requests, the FATF
report relied on case studies from its member countries, most of which involved
criminal conduct by lawyers." 6 Thus, despite requests to do so, the FATF report
provides little guidance to lawyers on how to avoid unwitting involvement in money
laundering or terrorist financing. The Lawyer's Guide was drafted in order to provide
such guidance.
In sum, the Guidance, ABA Formal Opinion 463, and the Lawyer's Guide,
along with the Recommendations, are the anchor documents around which U.S.
educational efforts are built. These documents have been, and will continue to be,
the focus of CLE sessions, articles, and web sites that have been directed towards
U.S. lawyers. U.S. legal profession organizations hope to educate lawyers so that it is
as natural for lawyers to consider money laundering and terrorist financing issues as
it is for them to consider conflict of interest issues. Similar to conflicts of interest,
this type of inquiry would be appropriate both at the outset and throughout the
course of the entire attorney-client relationship as new facts emerge or circumstances
change. While this type of educational approach is unlikely to persuade lawyers who
are undeterred by the criminal law system and intentionally engage in illegal
activities, the hope is that internalized education will reduce unwitting involvement
by lawyers in money laundering or terrorist financing.

115. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Bar Ass'n, to Fin. Action Task Force regarding Draft Typologies Report on
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals (May 6, 2013), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013may8-gatekeeperregfatf-1.
authcheckdam.pdf.
We are pleased that [the] FATF formed a working group to examine typologies involving
legal professionals. We feel this was a productive step to address the long-standing
concern we have repeatedly expressed regarding the absence of helpful typologies
involving legal professionals, especially those typologies highlighting unwitting
involvement of legal professionals in money laundering or terrorist financing activities....
One of the concerns we have expressed, most recently during our conference call in
February with the co-chair of the typologies working group, is that it is critically
important that the typologies be practical, meaningful, and helpful in assisting legal
professionals to detect money laundering and terrorist financing in their client intake
processes and, later, in their representation of clients on an on-going basis. Measured
from that standard, we feel that portion of the Typologies Draft dealing with the
typologies falls short in the following ways. a. First, some of the typologies contain dense
factual patterns that invariably involve complicit criminal activity by the legal professional.
Id. at 1-2; accord Letter from the Council of Bars & Law Soc'ys of Eur., to Fin. Action Task Force
regarding the Draft Typologies Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities
of Legal Professionals (June 4, 2013), http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument/
FinalLetter to FATF1_1370434174.pdf ("We note that the draft report unfortunately does not meet
its initial objective of identifying potential money laundering/terrorist financing 'vulnerabilities' of the
legal profession. This implied the elaboration of typologies illustrating situations where there are risks
for lawyers to unwittingly participate in money laundering activities even when lawyers have completed
their due diligence requirements.").
116. See, e.g., TYPOLOGIES

REPORT,

supra note 57, at 96-107.
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C. While ProgressHas Been Made, Work Remains to Be Done
Although significant educational steps have been undertaken, more work needs
to be done to minimize the chance that U.S. lawyers will be used to facilitate money
laundering or terrorist financing. During the symposium, Professor Shima Baradaran
spoke of an article she co-authored entitled "Funding Terror" that contains the
results of an empirical study."7 For this study, the authors sent several versions of an
email to firms around the world asking them if they would create a shell corporation
and maintain anonymity." 8 Some of the emails included references to countries
recognized as sites of terrorism or to charitable organizations that might serve as
fronts for terrorist financing." 9
While the article should be reviewed in its entirety, the results of this study were
both encouraging and discouraging. On the positive side, U.S. law firms scored
relatively high, meaning that not many responded to the fake email requests to set up
a shell corporation. 20 Although U.S. law firms responded "inappropriately' 121 at a
1 22
higher rate than corporation service providers in a number of tax-haven countries,
they were less likely to respond to these emails than providers in a number of other
countries, including Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. 23 The discouraging
24
aspect of this study was the fact that some U.S. lawyers responded to these emails.
As Baradaran's article and my own experience 12 reveal, additional work needs to
be done to ensure that as many U.S. lawyers as possible consider issues of money
laundering and terrorist financing when deciding whether-and how-to represent a
117. See Baradaran et al., supra note 41; seealso
New York Law School FATF Symposium, supra note 1.
118. Baradaran et al., supra note 41, at 509-13, 531-33.
119. Id. at 512.
120. The article stated that 84.1 percent of U.S. law firms declined to respond to the emails. Id. at 516 n.195.
Failing to respond is consistent with the risk-based approach that U.S. legal profession organizations
have endorsed.
121. It is worth noting, however, that because of the methodology the authors used, a U.S. law firm could be
rated partially compliant or even noncompliant for omitting actions that are not legally required of U.S.
lawyers (for example, failing to obtain notarized copies of government-issued identity documentation or
any photo identification). Id. at 513, 516.
122. The article offers a convincing explanation that tax haven countries may have a high rate of compliance
because they are subject to regular government scrutiny and "[t]hese governments understand the
importance of business clients and want to maintain a respectable reputation internationally for
incorporation and banking." See id. at 528-29.
123. Id. at 521 fig.3. Before becoming too complacent with the U.S. law firms' relatively strong performance,
it must be noted that the United States was the only country for which the authors disaggregated the
data regarding law firms and other corporation service providers. Accordingly, while we know that U.S.
law firms were less likely to respond positively to the fake emails than corporation service providers
from many other countries, we do not know how well U.S. law firms performed compared to law firms
in other countries. See id.
124. See id.
125. When I speak at CLE sessions to U.S. lawyers, I often ask for a show of hands of those who are familiar
with the Recommendations and the Guidance. While the numbers are growing, the responses have
convinced me that there is a need for ongoing education.
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client. But it is also clear that progress has been made in the efforts to educate U.S.
lawyers about these issues, which can play an important role in the global efforts to
reduce money laundering and terrorist financing. The next section suggests steps
that might be undertaken, in addition to continuing the previously described
educational efforts.
D. Additional EducationalSteps That May Be Useful
Although I have been active in efforts to educate U.S. lawyers about FATF
issues,' 26 my preparation for the symposium led me to ask myself whether there was
anything additional that either I, or the U.S. legal profession, might undertake in
order to promote better awareness of these issues. I concluded that the answer to
both of those questions was "Yes."
On a personal level, I decided that there was more that I could be doing in the
classroom. This year, for the first time, my legal ethics casebook contained material
about the FATE 127 1 discussed with my students the FATF information, showed the
ABA Gatekeeper web page, and discussed issues related to the Guidance. I could do
more, however. As a result of comments at the symposium by Professor Jack Sahl,
next year I plan to distribute the two-page Client Intake Form found in the Appendix
to the Guidance. 28 In addition, I plan to distribute a summary of the Guidance that
directs students to its Practice Pointers so that they can more easily synthesize the
information found in the forty-page document (the Appendix to this article is the
summary that I plan to distribute). Finally, I plan to distribute the recommendations
that ACTEC attaches to the Guidance. 29 Although the ACTEC recommendations
are designed for a trusts and estate practice, they provide a useful starting point to
help students visualize how both large firms and small firms might implement the
concepts embodied in the Guidance. 3 °
126. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 8. This article was part of a FATF program I helped organize for the AALS's

2010 Annual Meeting, when I was chair of the AALS Section of Professional Responsibility. The
presentation slides from that program, along with my presentation slides from the 2012 Midyear
Meeting of the National Organization of Bar Counsel, are cited on my "Presentations" web page under
the heading "Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Lawyer Regulation." See Laurel S. Terry, Selected
Presentations, PENN ST., http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/presentations.htm

(last visited

Apr. 10, 2015). For the last two years, I have served as a member of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper
Regulation and the Profession.
127.

RUSSELL

G.

PEARCE,

DANIEL J.

CAPRA,

BRUCE

A.

GREEN,

RENEE

KNAKE

&

LAUREL TERRY,

A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 404 (West 2d ed. 2013) (containing a
"Global Perspectives" note that focuses on the FATF and the Guidance).
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:

128. See GOOD PRACTICES

GUIDANCE,

supra note 84, at 38-39.

129. See Recommendations of Good Practicesfor ACTEC Fellows Seeking to Detect and Combat Money Laundering,
AM. C. TRUST & EST. COUNSEL (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.actec.org/public/GovernmentalRelations/
FATFBestPractices.asp.
130. Id. One can also look outside the United States for assistance. For example, the Federation of Law
Societies of Canada has adopted model rules related to Know Your Client (KYC) and accepting cash
from clients. See Model Rules to Fight Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, FED'N L. Soc'Ys
CANADA, available at http://www.flsc.ca/en/model-rules-to-fight-money-laundering-and-terrorist-

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 591I2014/15

I also took the opportunity while writing this article to consider actions the ABA
Gatekeeper Task Force might take to increase the effectiveness of its outreach. I
concluded that it might be useful to post on its web site a summary of the Guidance
(similar to that found in the Appendix to this article) and links to the outreach
efforts by state bars.' 3' Having these links centralized on a web page could encourage
those jurisdictions that currently do not have links to add them, and could also make
it easier for lawyers to locate the web pages, CLE sessions, and webinars that are
most relevant to their practice. Another step I recommend is posting on the ABA
Gatekeeper web page a set of clearly labeled "CLE" materials that state bars and
others could use when creating an education program. This package could include
not only the Guidance and the FAQ, but newly generated documents such as the
summary referred to above, sample intake forms, hypotheticals, and perhaps some
law review and ABAJournal articles.
Finally, I recommend that the ABA Task Force prepare a short summary of the
U.S. government document entitled "Money Laundering Threat Assessment" to use
in connection with CLE sessions and to post on its web page. 3 2 This document
would help lawyers understand the seriousness of these issues and why it is important
for lawyers to avoid unwittingly assisting money launderers or those involved in
terrorist financing. U.S. lawyers need to recognize the important role they can play
in facilitating--or inhibiting--these types of criminals.
V.

CONCLUSION

Most U.S. lawyers are not criminals and will not intentionally participate in
money laundering or terrorist financing schemes. For those lawyers who are willing
to engage in such intentional wrongdoing, however, the United States has an
elaborate system of criminal laws and disciplinary sanctions.
Because intentional conduct is addressed by both criminal law and lawyer
discipline, the U.S. legal profession's response to the Recommendations has focused
on educational efforts to help U.S. lawyers avoid unwittingly assisting a client who is
financing/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). These rules have been implemented throughout Canada. A
number of provinces provide forms for lawyers to use as part of the client identification and verification
process. See, e.g., LAW Soc'Y OF UPPER CAN., BYLAW 7.1, PART III: CLIENT IDENTIFICATION AND
VERIFICATION 7, available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id
2147485777
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015); N.S. BARRISTERS' Soc'Y, REGULATIONS MADE PURSUANT TO THE LEGAL
PROFESSION ACT § 4.5 (2014), available at http://cdn2.nsbs.org/sites/default/files/cms/menu-pdf/
currentregs.pdf. Although the Canadian KYC rules have been criticized by a leading Canadian
commentator for not utilizing the risk-based approach, seesources cited supra note 66, the Canadian
forms can provide helpful, concrete questions for lawyers who are unsure where to begin with a riskbased approach and for whom the trusts-and-estates-based sample intake form is inapplicable.
131. See supra note 72 (highlighting some of these web pages).
132. For information about the most recent Threat Assessment, see 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
STRATEGY, supra note 44, at app. A. The web page of the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation
and the Profession is a useful one-stop location for relevant information. See Task Force on Gatekeeper
Regulation and the Profession, AM. B. AsS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/
gatekeeper.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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engaged in money laundering or terrorist activities. Over the years, U.S. legal
organizations have developed a series of policy documents that are more detailed and
profession-specific than the Recommendations. These documents include the
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, referred to in this article as the Guidance; the
ABA FAQdocument regarding the Guidance; ABA Formal Opinion 463; and the
2014 Lawyer's Guide prepared by the ABA, CCBE, and IBA.
These documents provide the backbone for the educational efforts directed
towards U.S. lawyers and regulators. The goal is to encourage U.S. lawyers to use a
risk-based approach in which they thoughtfully consider client, service, and
geographic risks when deciding whether to represent a client. While there is still
work to be done with respect to educating U.S. lawyers about how to avoid unwitting
involvement in money laundering or terrorist financing, it is clear that progress is
being made. U.S. lawyers and legal organizations should continue their efforts so, at
the client intake stage, it becomes as natural for lawyers to consider money laundering
and terrorist financing issues as it is for them to consider conflict of interest issues.
In my view, the U.S. government and the U.S. legal profession are to be
commended for taking the "long view" in their approach to implementing the
Recommendations. Done well, a risk-based approach can engage lawyers' hearts and
minds and draw upon their commitment to avoid assisting money launderers or
terrorists. I believe that few lawyers would knowingly and willingly provide such
assistance. For this reason, an educational approach can be much more effective in
stopping terrorism and money laundering than a rules-based approach that may lead
to lawyers (or their staff) mindlessly checking boxes without thinking of the
consequences. Lawyers must learn how sophisticated clients might attempt to use
their services and take steps to avoid unwittingly assisting such clients. Such a result
would be helpful to the United States and to the world at large.
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APPENDIX

Laurel Terry's Summary & Supplement to the
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance (VGPG)'
(Prepared by Laurel Terry, LTerry@psu.edu)
ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) provides that a "lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent."
ABA Model Rule 1.16(a) requires that a lawyer withdraw from representation if "the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law."
Under Rule 8.4, a lawyer is subject to discipline if the lawyer violates or attempts to
violate a rule of professional conduct, commits a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; or engages
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, or that is prejudicial
to the administration ofjustice. Most state ethics rules are substantially similar to these
Model Rules. Because U.S. lawyers are subject to stringent conflict of interest rules
(Rules 1.7-1.9), client identification is a necessary part of lawyers' practices.
In 2008, the FATF adopted a risk based guidance document entitled "RBA
Guidance for Legal Professionals." This document is "high-level" guidance intended
to provide a broad framework for implementing a risk-based approach for the legal
profession. It urged the legal profession and individual countries to develop and
implement "an effective risk-based approach." (FATF RBA Guidance at
6-7). In
2010, a significant number of U.S. legal profession organizations endorsed the
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (VGPG) (The ABA House of Delegates
endorsed the VGPG document in August 2010). The VGPG summarizes the FATF
RBA Guidance but provides more detailed guidance to U.S. lawyers by including
Practice Pointers and Appendix A (p. 38) regarding client intake. ABA Formal
Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing
(May 23, 2013) confirms that lawyers who use the risk-based control measures
detailed in the VGPG to avoid aiding illegal activities are acting in a manner
consistent with the Model Rules. This Summary is not intended to replace the
VGPG but to provide a shorter, more visual summary and to help U.S. lawyers more
quickly locate the relevant section of the VGPG, including its Practice Pointers.
In addition to the VGPG, lawyers may find it useful to consult
the October 2014 Lawyers' Guide jointly prepared by the
2
International Bar Association, the CCBE, and the ABA.

1.

AM. BAR ASS'N, VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND COMBAT
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/

content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal-justice/voluntary-good-practices-guidance.authcheckdam.pdf.

2.

AM.

BAR ASS'N,

A LAWYER'S

GUIDE TO DETECTING AND PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERING

(2014),

available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct-abaguidepreventingmoneylaundering.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Are any of the following present? (See VGPG Practice Pointers (PP)found on pp. 12-14)
1. Buying or selling of Real Estate?
2.

Managing client money, securities, or other assets?

3.

Management of bank, savings, or securities account?

4.

Organization of contributions for the creation, operation, or management of companies?

5.

Creation, operation/management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and
selling of business entities?

4

If the answer to any of these questions is "YES "terform Client Due Diligence (CDD).
In determining the appropriate levelof CDD,
considerthe three major risk categories:

1.

Country/GeograthicRisk (See PP on p. 16)

2.

ClientRisk (See PP on pp. 17-21)
The FATF RBA Guidance identifies ten categories of potentially higher risk clients:
(1) politically exposed persons (PEPS); (2) unusual activity; (3) masking beneficial
ownership; (4) cash intensive business (unless subject to AML/CFT regulation); (5)
charities and NPOs not subject to monitoring or supervision; (6) financial
intermediaries not subject to adequate AML/CFT rules; (7) clients with criminal
convictions; (8) clients with no address/multiple addresses; (9) unexplained change in
instructions; and (10) structures with no legal purpose.

3.

Service Risk (See PP on pp. 21-28)
The FATF RBA Guidance identifies fourteen types of services that are at higher risk
for money laundering and terrorist financing. These typically involve the movement of
funds and/or the concealment of beneficial ownership: (1) touching the money test; (2)
concealment of beneficial ownership; (3) performing services outside area of expertise;
(4) accelerated real estate transfers; (5) cash payments and payments from other sources;
(6) inadequate consideration; (7) estate administration where the decedent had been
convicted of proceeds generating crimes; (8) extraordinary legal fees; (9) source of
funds/wealth; (10) out of character transactions; (11) shell companies; (12) hard-toidentify trust beneficiaries; (13) anonymity; and (14) trust services.
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ControlsforHigherRiskClients: The FATF RBA Guidance does not prohibit a lawyer from
representing a higher-risk client, but it directs the lawyer to implement appropriate measures
and controls to mitigate the potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks of
those higher-risk clients.
+ These measures and controls may include the following: (1) general training; (2) specific
training; (3) enhanced due diligence; (4) peer/managerial oversight; (5) evolving
evaluation of services; (6) ongoing/evolving evaluation of clients; and (7) overlap.
These measures, together with a Practice Pointer, are set forth in greater detail on pp. 32-34.
Variables IatMayAffectRisk: In determining the appropriate level of CDD, the FATF RBA
Guidance identifies a number of variables that may require enhanced due diligence or that may
lead the lawyer to conclude that standardCDD can be reduced:
+ These variables include: (1) the nature of the client relationship; (2) existing regulation;
(3) reputation and publicly available information; (4) regularity/duration of relationship;
(5) familiaritywith country/laws; (6) duration/magnitude of attorney-client relationship;
(7) local counsel; (8) geographic disparity; (9) one-shot transactions; (10) technological
developments favoring anonymity; (11) client origination/referral source; (12) structure
of client/transaction; and (13) trusts that are pension funds.
Each of these risk variables is discussed in greater detail in the VGPG Practice Pointers on
pp. 28-32.

Basic Protocol for Client Intake and Assessment (VGPG pp. 34-39),
including its Appendix A:
Standard Level of Client Due Diligence

1.

Identity the client and verity that client's
identity using reliable independent
source documents, data, or information.
Document the findings. See VGPG on
p. 3 5

1. Identity the client and verity the client's
identity using reliable independent
source documents, data, or information.
Document the findings. See VGPG on
p. 35.

See VGPG on p. 35 at 6.1 for examples of
information and documents the lawyer may
use. See Appendix A at 1.1, p. 38 for additional
identity information a lawyer should seek
depending on the circumstances. See 2.1 for
potential verification steps, depending on the
risk profile of the client, including an OFAC
scan, other searches, and background checks.
See VGPG Appendix A, #2 on p. 39; see also
url cited on the following page.

See VGPG on p. 35 at 6.1 and 6.2 for examples
of information and documents the lawyer may
use. See Appendix A at 1.2, p. 38 for additional
identity information a lawyer should seek
depending on the circumstances. See Appendix
A at 2.1 on p. 39 for potential verification steps,
depending on the risk profile of the client,
including an OFAC scan, other searches, and
background checks.

2

Obtain information on the purpose and
intended nature of the business relationship.
See p. 35.

2.

Obtain information on the purpose and
intended nature of the business relationship.
See VGPG p. 35.
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Enh11anced Lev'el 4f~1ient
*

*

"

Dtue Diligellce

Re(duced Level of Client Dtle Didigence

Clients that are reasonably determined

Lawyers can use reduced CDD with:

by the lawyer to be of higher risk require
enhanced CDD.
Enhanced client due diligence means a
more in-depth, systematic inquiry into
the inenth,
nd tsoership anduibusins
the client and its ownership and business
activities.
The lawyer needs to ensure that the
client and its ownership and business
activities comply with applicable law
and that no criminal activity is involved.
See VGPG PP at p. 36.

1. Publicly listed companies.
2. Financial institutions subject to AML/
CFT regulation.
3. Government authorities and state-run
enterprises. See VGPG p. 36.
See also the prior risk-based analysis on pp.
488-489.

CRITICAL NOTE: "Not every risk-based approach analysis of a potential client will
inexorably lead to the conclusion that, with appropriate controls, the lawyer can accept
and proceed with the proposed engagement. It may bepossible thatthe lawyer's analysis
will lead the lawyer to reject the engagementor to withdrawfrom the representation."See
VGPG p. 37; see also your state's equivalent of ABA Model Rules 1.2(d), 1.16, and 8.4.
Periodic review may be appropriate depending on the risk factors. The VGPG and
ACTEC Sample Intake forms are very helpful. See generaly AM. BAR ASS'N, APPENDIX
A: BASIC CLIENT INTAKE, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/GAO/voluntarygoodpracticesguidanceAppendix%20A.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE
COUNSEL, FATF AND THE GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE (Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/ACTEC%20
Appendix%20C.authcheckdam.pdf.

